--- a/base/rendered.txt
+++ b/head/rendered.txt
@@ -581,6 +581,16 @@
 When a Trust Manifest appears on a Host Info object, identity
 SHOULD match the host's identifier field when present.
 
+An artifact may legitimately hold more than one verifiable identity at
+the same time, for example a SPIFFE ID for runtime workload identity
+and a DID for publisher-anchored organizational identity, or it may
+retain a former identifier after a rename or migration between
+identities or schemes. Additional identities are declared through the
+OPTIONAL alsoKnownAs member (see Optional Members).
+The identity field remains the single canonical subject identifier:
+consumers MUST use identity when referencing the artifact's trust
+subject or checking identity equivalence between entries.
+
 When multiple entries share the same identifier (with different version
 values), each entry MAY carry its own Trust Manifest. There is no
 requirement that all versions carry identical trust metadata — trust
@@ -622,7 +632,50 @@
 
 A string providing a type hint for the identity URI (e.g., "did",
 "spiffe", "dns"). This field is OPTIONAL when the type is evident
-from the URI scheme.
+from the URI scheme. It describes only identity; each entry of
+alsoKnownAs carries its own identityType member.
+
+alsoKnownAs
+
+An array of Identity Alias objects, each asserting an identity of
+the same subject as identity under an alternative identity
+scheme. An Identity Alias object MUST contain:
+
+identity
+
+A string containing a globally unique URI [[RFC3986]] that
+identifies the same subject as the manifest's canonical
+identity.
+
+An Identity Alias object MAY contain:
+
+identityType
+
+A string providing a type hint for the alias identity URI
+(e.g., "did", "spiffe", "dns"). This member is OPTIONAL when
+the type is evident from the URI scheme.
+
+The following rules apply:
+
+An alias is an equivalent identity of the subject; the
+manifest's identity alone remains canonical and is used for
+referencing and equivalence checking. Aliases MAY also record
+former identifiers of the subject, preserving continuity after
+a rename or a migration between identities or schemes.
+
+The array is an unordered set: it MUST NOT contain two aliases
+with the same identity value, and no alias identity may
+equal the manifest's canonical identity.
+
+The domain-alignment rule defined in Identity
+applies only to the canonical identity. Aliases MAY belong to
+different trust domains or identity schemes.
+
+Aliases are publisher claims covered by the Trust Manifest
+signature; no per-alias proof is required. Consumers MUST NOT
+rely on an alias from a manifest whose signature is absent or
+fails verification (see
+Verifying Alternative Identities).
 
 trustSchema
 
@@ -689,6 +742,12 @@
 {
 "identity": "did:web:acme.com:agent:finance",
 "identityType": "did",
+"alsoKnownAs": [
+{
+"identity": "spiffe://acme.com/ns/finance/sa/finance-agent-pod",
+"identityType": "spiffe"
+}
+],
 "trustSchema": {
 "identifier": "urn:trust:acme-enterprise-v1",
 "version": "1.0",
@@ -1070,6 +1129,34 @@
 Manifest signature. Consumers MUST treat publisher fields as advisory
 unless a verified publisher-identity attestation cryptographically
 binds publisher.identifier to the signed manifest's identity.
+
+Verifying Alternative Identities
+
+Aliases need no verification procedure of their own. Because the
+signed payload covers alsoKnownAs, verifying the Trust Manifest
+signature as described in
+Trust Manifest Signatures also verifies
+every listed alias: a valid signature proves that the publisher
+controlling the canonical identity claims each alias as an
+equivalent identity of the subject. Consumers MUST NOT rely on aliases
+from a manifest whose signature is absent or fails verification.
+
+Signature verification itself always keys off the canonical identity:
+the verification key is resolved from identity as described in
+Trust Manifest Signatures. A consumer
+that cannot resolve the canonical identity scheme cannot verify the
+signature and therefore cannot rely on any alias.
+
+Once the signature is verified, a consumer MAY use whichever identity,
+canonical or alias, fits the identity schemes its tooling operates
+on. For example, after verifying the signature through a resolvable
+canonical DID identity, the consumer can use a SPIFFE ID alias to
+match the artifact's runtime workload identity.
+
+Note that the signature proves the publisher claims the alias, not
+that the alias's own trust domain acknowledges the link. Consumers
+making authorization decisions inside the alias's trust domain MAY
+additionally obtain proof of control native to the alias scheme.
 
 Verifying Artifact Integrity
 
@@ -1664,6 +1751,7 @@
 class TrustManifest {
 identity string
 subject Subject
+alsoKnownAs IdentityAlias[]
 trustSchema TrustSchema
 attestations Attestation[]
 provenance ProvenanceLink[]
@@ -1674,6 +1762,10 @@
 url string
 type string
 digest string
+}
+class IdentityAlias {
+identity string
+identityType string
 }
 class TrustSchema {
 identifier string
@@ -1696,6 +1788,7 @@
 CatalogEntry --> "0..1" TrustManifest : trustManifest
 HostInfo --> "0..1" TrustManifest : trustManifest
 TrustManifest --> "0..1" Subject : subject
+TrustManifest --> "*" IdentityAlias : alsoKnownAs
 TrustManifest --> "0..1" TrustSchema : trustSchema
 TrustManifest --> "*" Attestation : attestations
 TrustManifest --> "*" ProvenanceLink : provenance
@@ -1852,6 +1945,7 @@
 TrustManifest = {
 identity: text,
 ? identityType: text,
+? alsoKnownAs: [* IdentityAlias],
 ? trustSchema: TrustSchema,
 ? attestations: [* Attestation],
 ? provenance: [* ProvenanceLink],
@@ -1859,6 +1953,11 @@
 ? termsOfServiceUrl: text,
 ? signature: text,
 ? extensions: { * text => any }
+}
+
+IdentityAlias = {
+identity: text,
+? identityType: text
 }
 
 TrustSchema = {
@@ -1912,6 +2011,12 @@
 "trustManifest": {
 "identity": "spiffe://acme.com/ns/finance/sa/finance-a2a-pod",
 "identityType": "spiffe",
+"alsoKnownAs": [
+{
+"identity": "did:web:acme-corp.com:agent:finance-a2a",
+"identityType": "did"
+}
+],
 "attestations": [
 {
 "type": "publisher-identity",
